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This paper revisits the literature on modelling organizations by means of networks of agents.
Individual agents are engaged in screening projects, and architectural features of organizations,
that is how each agent's decision combines with those of others, a®ect the organization's screening
performance. It emphasizes how an organization of several agents may improve upon individual
performance by a suitable arrangement of the °ow of decisions. The paper is motivated, in part, by
a theorem due to Von Neumann (also exploited by Moore and Shannon) on how to build reliable
networks using unreliable components. It also extends previous contributions by Sah and Stiglitz
by recasting their original model in more standard ¯rm-theoretic terms and by endogenizing its
features.
For an organization to perform better than an individual in terms of screening, its screening
function must be sigmoid as a function of individual screening performance, as measured by the
probability that a good (bad) project be accepted (rejected). This property is indeed satis¯ed
by organizations with mixed Sah-stiglitz architectures, such as hierarchies made up of components
that are polyarchies, and polyarchies made up of components that are hierarchies. This property
is in turn critical for determining the optimal number of levels of a hierarchy, and for endogenizing
individual screening performance. The models are extended to allow for individuals' own screening
to be in°uenced by the opinions of superiors and subordinates. The paper examines the implications
of such interactions for the limits to organizational performance.
JEL classi¯cation codes: D200, D230. Keywords: organizations, architecture, complexity, com-
position.
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This paper revisits the literature on modelling organizations by means of networks of agents. In-
dividual agents are engaged in screening projects, and architectural features of organizations, that
is the speci¯cs of how an agent's decision combines with those of others, a®ect an organization's
screening performance. It emphasizes how an organization of several agents may improve upon
individual screening performance by a suitable arrangement of the °ow of decisions, that is, or-
ganizational architecture. The possibility that is pursued in this paper is motivated, in part, by
a theorem due to von Neumann (1956) and to Moore and Shannon (1956). The paper extends
previous contributions by Sah and Stiglitz (1985; 1986; 1988) by recasting their original model in
more standard ¯rm-theoretic terms.
For an organization's screening performance to improve over that of an individual, its screen-
ing function must be sigmoid in individual performance, as measured by the probability that a
good (bad) project be accepted (rejected). This is, indeed, the case for organizations with mixed
Sah{Stiglitz architectures, such as hierarchies made up of components that are polyarchies and pol-
yarchies made up of components that are hierarchies, but not for pure Sah{Stiglitz architectures.
This property is in turn critical for endogenizing individual screening performance. The models are
extended to allow for individuals' own screening outcomes to combine with in°uence from others,
subordinates and superiors. The paper examines the implications of such interactions for the limits
to organizational performance of complex organizational architectures.
It appears to be particularly timely to revisit the literature on organizational architecture. The
revival of interest in economic consequences of social interactions has been attracting a lot of at-
tention, and so have applications of economic tools to understanding cognition and other aspects
of actual human behavior. Noteworthy contributions to this literature emphasize that individuals
attack complex problems by means of intelligent shortcuts, which may be studied as approxima-
tions of fully optimal decisions [Gabaix and Laibson (2001); MacLeod (1997)]. A separate strand
of research has been motivated by the increasing importance of information and communication
technologies in modern organizations. These technologies may be changing the organization of
the place of work, exactly as past epochs of rapid technological innovations have been associated
with organizational change [Ahuja and Carley (1999)]. Such experiences behoove us to reconsiderwhether the basic economic tools for studying organizations within the canonical model of the
¯rm are good models for contemporary organizations [ c.f. Allen (2000) ]. This paper aims at
contributing to such an e®ort by viewing organizations as being made up of sets of interacting
agents.
Some of the current research on organizations invokes the notion of organizational complexity.
Complexity is a well-de¯ned concept in computer science: computational complexity pertains to
how hard it is to perform computations needed to solve computationally well-de¯ned problems [
Papadimitriou (1994) ]. Yet, it is an often-used but not so well-de¯ned problem in the economics of
organizations. For example, many authors appeal to Simon (1962), who emphasizes the hierarchical
nature of complex systems in nature. The notion of complexity invoked here is similar to the
one developed by Mount and Reiter (1998; 2002). Rivkin (2001), and especially Visser (2001a),
de¯ne as complex organizational structures that are made up of a \large number of divisions or
hierarchical layers or if they contain many interdependent parts the individual functioning of which
is of importance to the overall performance of the organization" [ Visser (2001a), p. 1. ] One of
the objectives of this paper is to help assess the notion of complexity in the context of the theory
of organizations.2 Fioretti and Visser (2002) focuses away from de¯ning organizational complexity
directly in terms of organizational architecture and emphasize instead the importance of linking
with the human cognition of \a structure or behavior."
The present paper retains a \connectionist" approach and de¯nes complexity in terms of mix-
ing speci¯c patterns of interdependence (\connections") between members of an organization. In
particular, it associates complexity with organizational architectures that are made up of compo-
nents that are organized in a particular way, while each of them is made up of agents organized
in a di®erent way. For example, a hierarchy typically involves a clear line of authority among its
members, from higher to lower levels. We consider organizations whose components are arranged
hierarchically, but within each component decisions are made, say, by consensus among individual
2Visser (2001a) de¯nes complexity as the level of detail that is necessary to correctly assign agents to positions
in the organizational structure; performance is de¯ned in terms of the maximum expected pro¯t associated with the
structure; and, robustness is measured in terms of the maximal extent in which expected pro¯ts on implemented
projects fall short of the optimal case which would obtain if agents had been correctly assigned. Visser shows that
increasing organizational complexity is associated with reducing robustness, at least for the speci¯c organizational
forms which he examines in the paper. Visser (2001b) argues in favor of cognition aspects of complexity. He proposes
to study organizations in terms of three possible types of information about agents' characteristics that may be used
in designing organizations, that is, no information, ordinal information, and cardinal information.
1agents. Such organizations are of course quite common, but they have not been studied extensively.
As we see in further detail below, it is an important result of the paper that it is such \mixing"
of architectures that makes it possible for an organization to perform better in terms of screening
relative to the screening performance of an individual member.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de¯nes ¯rms as networks of inter-
dependent decisions, elaborates on architectural features and motivates the principle of composition
by drawing on the von Neumann{Moore{Shannon theorem of optimal network design. Section 3
endogenizes individual screening performance via setting the wage rate so as to maximixe pro¯t
and studies organizations that involve both hierarchical and polyarchical features. Section 4 turns
to a model of organizations, which employs a cognitive component. This allows us to distinguish
between uncertainties a®ecting an agent's knowledge that are inherent in decision making, on one
hand, and with the in°uence from co-workers, on the other, and poses the problem of optimizing
organizational architecture.
2 The Firm as a Network of Interdependent Decisions
A vibrant literature in organizational science has developed in the last few years that emphasizes
the complexity of interactions over decisions.3 Suppose that in evaluating an investment project,
a ¯rm must carry out di®erent pairwise comparisons that may be construed in a nested setting,
such as what technology to adopt, how to implement it, and so on. An example is the problem of
having to decide over di®erent materials that may be used in a particular production setting, where
materials must be combined with one another, sort of like when one must decide how to dress, as in
an example invoked by MacLeod (1997). Another example is a ¯rm's deciding whether to have its
own sales sta® or to sell through third parties, whether to pursue its own R&D or not, etc. Thus,
a ¯rm may be modelled as a network of interdependent decisions, where each individual decision
pertains to elementary choices, as above.
Let the set I = fi : i = 1;:::;Ig represent the members of a ¯rm (or organization). A
¯rm that needs to make I binary decisions about how to con¯gure its activities allocate each
3Some of these works also utilize the so-called NK model of Kau®man (1993), such as Marengo et al. (2000),
Rivkin (2000), and Rivkin and Siggelkow (2001). Rivkin and Siggelkow emphasize how a ¯rm's formal organizational
structure a®ects its ability to cope with interdependent decisions.
2decision to a single agent of the organization. Any set of technological constraints a®ecting a
¯rm's decisions component may be expressed in terms of patterns of interdependence among a
set of interdependent binary decisions [MacLeod (1997)]. Let the I¡tuple of binary variables
di; D = (d1;:::;dI); denote the outcomes. Each decision di contributes to the ¯rm's objective
a term depends in general on decision i and on all other decisions, d¡i; Ci = Ci(di;d¡i): The
interdependence of decisions is represented by an adjacency matrix E; an I £I matrix, where entry
ij being equal to 1, eij = 1; suggests that the decision of agent i in°uences agent j; and eij = 0
suggests that the decisions of agent i does not in°uence agent j: We set eii = 1: If E is a diagonal
matrix of 1s, then all decisions are independent; if it is full, then all decisions are interdependent.
Block structure suggests that decisions may be decided by groups of interdependent agents, within
which decisions are interdependent and across them are independent.4
The pattern of how an agent in°uences others may be represented by E; or alternatively, by
a graph with the set I as its nodes. Such a general graph-theoretic description of organizations
may accommodate easily di®erent notions of authority. E.g., let sets Ik; k = 1;:::;K; I =
S
k Ik
represent the sets of agents at the di®erent hierarchy levels, with k = 1 being the single agent at
the apex of the hierarchy; º(i) is the set of agents who report to i with jº(i)j being their number,
or i's in-degree; and ¹(i) is the agent whom i reports to, agent i's boss, that is each node has
out-degree equal to 1, j¹(i)j = 1. So, if i 2 º(j); then j = ¹(i): And, if i 2 Ik; then º(i) 2 Ik+1:
The graph representing the organization is directed, with direction representing authority, °owing
from superior to subordinate.
The problem of organizational architecture is to allocate di®erent decisions to di®erent agents
and to set jointly interdependencies among decisions, that is to determine E; given the types of
decisions to be made and associated technological constraints. Complex problems facing ¯rms are
those that are highly dimensional and \whose solution requires the coordination of interdependent
components" [ Marengo et al. (2000) ]. The present paper focuses on organizations all of whose
agents face the same decision, that is, whether a particular project should be adopted or rejected.
Organizational design, which is the object of the present study, a®ects organizational performance
4In Kau®man's \NK" model, each of N decisions is a®ected by K of other N decisions. In Kau®man's biology
and genetics applications, as K increases relative to N; optima become \rugged" and \multi-peaked" [ Kau®man
(1993), 66-67 ].
3as a function of the screening abilities of individual workers.
2.1 Individual Screening Performance and the Objective of the Firm
Workers screen projects. Each project's quality may be either good or bad, and is unobservable.
Screening is imperfect but informative. That is, a good project is more likely to be accepted than
a bad project. Let ® and 1 ¡ ®; 0 < ® < 1; denote the proportions of good and bad projects,
respectively, within the population of projects, from which a ¯rm draws randomly. The ¯rm's costs
are simply labor costs,
P
i2I wi; with agent i receiving a wage rate wi: We assume that individuals'
screening ability depends on the wage rate, which is paid before project quality is revealed. As
functions of the wage rate, the probability of an agent's accepting a good project, pg = Pg(w);
and of rejecting a bad one, 1 ¡ Pb(w); both take values in [0;1]; and are increasing and concave in
the wage rate. Consequently, the probability of an agent's accepting a bad project, Pb(w); which
also takes values in [0;1]; is decreasing and convex in the wage rate. We assume that wages are
paid before agents have made their screening decisions. Clearly, for screening to be informative,
1 > pg > pb > 0: It is appropriate to interpret 1¡pg; the probability that a good project is rejected,
as the Type-I error, and pb; the probability that a bad project is accepted, as the Type-II error, for
the organization.
Let Rg > 0 and Rb < 0 denote the revenue to a ¯rm (organization) from implementing a good
and bad project, respectively. The probability that an organization accept a project, conditional on
its quality j = g;b; is given by the screening function P(pj): The expected pro¯t from considering
a randomly selected project is given by




2.2 Organizational Architecture and Composition
Sah and Stiglitz [ Sah and Stiglitz (1985; 1986; 1988), and Sah (1991) ] de¯ne polyarchies as
organizational structures with agents operating \in parallel:" a polyarchy approves of a project if
at least one of the agents in the organization approves of it. They de¯ne hierarchies as organization
with agents operating \in series": a hierarchy approves of a project only if all agents approve
of it. Sah and Stiglitz compare the screening e®ectiveness of such stylized organizations. An
4organization's screening function P(p) is the probability that the organization accept a project as a
function of the probability that each member accept a project is p: The function P(p) summarizes
the impact of organizational architecture.
Following Sah{Stiglitz, op. cit., for an organization with two members whose screening abilities
are equal and given by the probability of accepting a project p; the probability that a project is
accepted by a polyarchy of two agents is equal to the probability that a project be accepted by at
least one of them: PP(p) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)2 = 2p ¡ p2: The probability that a project is accepted by a
hierarchy with two agents is equal to the probability that a project be accepted by both of them:
PH(p) = p2: It follows that PP(p) > PH(p); 8p 2 [0;1]: Therefore, polyarchies accept more good
and more bad projects than hierarchies. Since 1¡PP(p) < 1¡PH(p); hierarchies reject more good
and bad projects than polyarchies. Both types of organizational architectures are informative, that
is for both of them, the probability of accepting a project is increasing in the probability that an
agent accept a project. As a result, a good project is more likely to be accepted than a bad project.
Sah and Stiglitz (1988) apply their framework to study of the performance of committees, where
decisions are made by di®erent ways of aggregating the individual decisions (plurality rules). E. g.,
a polyarchy is a committee that operates with a plurality of 1, and a hierarchy is a committee that
operates with unanimity. They do discuss brie°y the possibility of more complex organizations,
such as if polyarchies include hierarchies as their elements and vice versa [ ibid., 467{468 ] but do
not explore their properties.
Ioannides (1987)5 draws on von Neumann (1956) and Moore and Shannon (1956) to show that
it is possible, in general, to improve the screening performance of organizations of the general class
studied by Sah and Stiglitz by means of complicating their architecture in a very precise sense. That
is, by replacing each agent with a replica of the entire organization (which resembles replacing an
agent with a committee) and provided that the architecture satis¯es certain basic properties (to
be elaborated upon shortly below), it is possible to design an organization that satis¯es arbitrary
speci¯ed performance criteria. That is, the organization must reject projects, whose probability of
being accepted is below a speci¯ed threshold, and must accept projects, whose probability of being
accepted is above a speci¯ed threshold. This process is known as composition.6
5See also Koh (1992), Anderson (1999) and Visser (2000).
6Moore and Shannon (1956) in turn credit Von Neumann (1956) for the original idea of using (unreliable) She®er
5The composition operation accomplishes this objective but at great increase in organization
size: replacing each member of an organization of size n with n members causes the size to increase
from n to n2; and the next composition increases it to n4; and to n16; and so on. Note that this
is much faster than the increase in the number of agents when the number of levels of a pyramidal
hierarchy, K; while the span of control s remains ¯xed. In the latter case, the number of agents
in a hierarchy of K levels with a span of control of s; 1 + s + ::: + sK increases by sK+1; when
the number of levels increases from K to K + 1: It is appropriate to refer to the outcome of the
composition process as producing an organization of increasing complexity, with Mount and Reiter
(1998) being in agreement. Still, composition as a way of improving an organization's screening
performance is not practical because of the great accompanying increase in the number of agents.
For an organizational architecture to lend itself to improvement by composition it must possess
a screening function that satis¯es the following property [ Ioannides (1987) ]: the screening function
must possess a single ¯xed point that is strictly greater than 0 and strictly less than 1, and must cut
the 45o line from below at that point. In other words, since the 45o line represents the response of an
organization with a single agent, there must exist a value of the screening probability between 0 and
1 that makes an individual agent equivalent to the entire organization. Composition reduces the
probability of a project's being accepted by the organization, if each individual agent's acceptance
probability is below this characteristic value, and increases it, if it is above. See Figure 1. In
Figure 1, starting with an organization with screening function P(p); composition associates with
individual screening performance p organizational performance P (P(p)):
The mathematical intuition of this result should be straightforward to economists familiar with
dynamical systems. Just as in dynamical systems, the higher-order iterates of a time map share with
the original map the same ¯xed point, composition is the \spatial" counterpart of iterating the time
map of a dynamical system. The ¯xed point of the screening function re°ects fundamental aspects
of organizational architecture and is not disturbed by \spatially" iterating the screening function.
Of course, it is the rapid increase of the number of agents that make the von Neumann{Moore{
stroke organs as components of reliable organisms. A She®er stroke is the Boolean operation \(.not. A) .and. (.not.
B) on Boolean variables A and B. It has the property, which Von Neumann exploits, that all logical operations can
be generated from it. A She®er stroke organ is the logical operation with two binary inputs A and B which performs
this logical operation, possibly unreliably. The von Neumann approach is noteworthy because it deals explicitly with
the stochastics of error-prone components.
6Shannon theorem work. The von Neumann{Moore{Shannon theorem motivates us to explore how
complicating organizational architecture by means of cross-composition may improve organizational
screening performance.7 As Ioannides (1987) points out, pure Sah{Stiglitz architectures are not
improvable by means of composition. However, as we see shortly, cross-composing a hierarchy
with a polyarchy (and vice versa) just once, that is, by replacing each agent in a pure hierarchy
by a component which itself is a polyarchy, makes the organization's screening function sigmoid.
Therefore, it is, in principle, possible to make an organization more e®ective both in screening good
and bad projects. It is to developing this concept that we turn next.
Mount and Reiter (1998; 2002) and Reiter (1996) develop a model of the ¯rm, in which orga-
nizational structure emerges as a solution of an optimization problem. The problem involves how
to carry out computations and trades o® the \complexity" of economic computations in a given
class of economic environments, and the constraints express limitation on the abilities of agents to
compute and communicate. Computations are decomposed in terms \auxiliary" computations that
can be expressed as a superposition (composition, in our terminology) of the primitive functions
performed in terms of \lower level" computations (or agents). Their measure of complexity is then
simply the depth of superposition, which in our case corresponds to the number of hierarchies.
The model of the present paper is conceptually similar to the Mount{Reiter model of the ¯rm.
Our agents's evaluations are akin to computations, and organizational architecture is akin to the
execution of computations in the Mount and Reiter model.
3 Sah{Stiglitz Architectures as Building Blocks of Complex Or-
ganizations
We consider ¯rst pure Sah{Stiglitz organizations made up of identical agents. We study their
properties as the number of agents increases. For a hierarchy of IH members, the screening function
PH(p) = pIH is convex increasing in p and convex decreasing in IH: For good projects, it is a
7We note that, however tempting, a direct comparison of the von Neumann{Moore{Shannon theorem to results
on neural networks as universal approximators would be simplistic. The von Neumann{Moore{Shannon theorem
exploits the particular nonlinearity of the probability that an organization will approve of a project as a function
of the individual performance so as to satisfy desired performance standards by means of spatially iterating the
function. The universal approximator theorem for neural networks [ Haykin (1999), 208{209, 229 ] exploits the
particular nonlinearity of the sigmoid function that makes it perform well as a functional form for the components
of a power series.





g=Pg (>) 0; for
bad projects, it is decreasing convex function of the wage rate. If the probability of accepting good
projects is, roughly speaking, su±ciently insensitive to the wage rate, maximization of expected
pro¯t de¯nes an optimal wage.
For a polyarchy, the screening function PP(p) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)IP is concave increasing in p and
concave increasing in IP: For good projects, it is a concave increasing function of the wage rate;





b=1¡Pb > IP ¡ 1 (<) 0: If the
probability of rejecting bad projects is, roughly speaking, su±ciently insensitive to the wage rate,
maximization of expected pro¯t de¯nes an optimal wage. An optimal size exists for the polyarchy,
but for the hierarchy, expected revenue is decreasing convex in size and so is expected pro¯t.
3.1 Complex Architectures with Sah{Stiglitz Components
Since pure Sah{Stiglitz architectures make di®erent kinds of errors, e.g., polyarchies accept more
good and bad projects and hierarchies reject more good and bad projects, suitably complicating
organizational architecture could o®set the undesirable, and strengthen the desirable, properties of
each of the two stylized architectures. We see, in fact, that cross-composition makes the screening
performance of such organizations a sigmoid function of individual screening performance, that
satis¯es the condition stated above, namely that it possesses a unique ¯xed point in (0;1) where it
intersects the 45o line from below. Therefore, there exists a speci¯c value of individual screening
probability, below (above) which, the probability of accepting a project by the organization is less
(greater) than the probability that an individual agent approves a project. Therefore, as long as
screening is informative, organizational design improves on individual screening e®ectiveness.
We establish ¯rst some general properties of two alternative organizational architectures whose
agents have identical screening performance. Let the total number of agents I and the number of
hierarchies K be su±ciently so that I
K may be treated as an integer. One alternative architecture is a
hierarchy with components that are polyarchies, and the other is a polyarchy with components that
are hierarchies, hierarchies of polyarchies and polyarchies of hierarchies, for short. The screening
function of a pure Sah{Stiglitz hierarchy, PH(p); and of a pure Sah{Stiglitz polyarchy, PP(p);
de¯ned earlier, are monotone increasing in (0;1) with Pj(0) = 0; Pj(1) = 1;j = H;P: It follows
8that the screening function of a hierarchy of polyarchies , with a total number of I members who
are arranged in K equal-sized hierarchies, is given by
PHP ´ PH [PP(p)] =
³





Similarly, the screening function of a polyarchy of I
K hierarchies, each of which has K members, is
given by





The ¯rst order conditions with respect to screening performance involve the ¯rst derivatives
of the screening functions, P0
H [PP(p)]P0
P(p) and P0
P [PH(p)]PH0(p); respectively. We show next
that both these derivatives are equal to 0 for p = 0;1: Since these functions are monotone in-











H: The zero of the second derivative
of these functions, indicates the respective in°ection point, ^ p, which we obtain in closed form for
hierarchies of polyarchies, and for polyarchies of hierarchies. Next we turn to exploring in detail
these properties.
3.1.1 Hierarchies of Polyarchies
We set ¯rst the optimal number of hierarchies, given a total number of I = jIj agents with identical
screening performance. Let the number of agents to allocated to hierarchy levels 1;2;:::;K be
given by (I1;I2;:::;IK); where
PK
k=1 Ik = I; and let Ik members at level k be organized as a
polyarchy. Then the probability of accepting a project by such an organization is given by PHP =
[1¡(1¡p)I1]£:::£[1¡(1¡p)IK]; where we follow the mnemonic rule that HP stands for hierarchies
of polyarchies. The problem of maximizing the screening performance of such an organization
when the total number of members I and a number of levels of the hierarchy K are given is
straightforward. We assume, for simplicity, that I is much larger than K and that both are
continuous quantities rather than integer ones. Since the screening e®ectiveness of the organization
is an increasing concave function of each of the Ik's, its maximum over the convex set de¯ned by
the given total number of agents occurs when the sizes of all polyarchies are equalized, given the
number of hierarchy levels. Therefore, under the assumption that I is divisible by K; there are
9I
K agents in each polyarchy and the screening function of a hierarchy of K polyarchies is given by
(??) above. This function has the following properties. First, it is an increasing concave function
of the total number of agents, I: That is, adding agents while holding constant the number of
hierarchies has the e®ect of increasing the likelihood of acceptance of all projects. Second, the
screening function is a decreasing convex function of the number of levels of the hierarchy K;
provided that each hierarchy has at least one agent. It follows that the determination of the
optimal number of hierarchy levels must rest on other considerations. Third, it is a monotonically
increasing but sigmoid function of p: This follows from the fact that the ¯rst derivative of the
screening function with respect to p is @
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I ; which is in (0;1); provided that I > K > 1: The screening function
PHP intersects the 45o line from below at a single point, the unique ¯xed point ^ pHP; of PHP in
(0;1):
As more hierarchy levels are added, the in°ection point of the screening function increases
making screening more demanding; as more agents are added while holding the number of hierarchy
levels constant, the ¯xed point of the screening function decreases. It is therefore not possible both
to improve the organization's performance in rejecting poor projects and in approving good projects
in this fashion. A tradeo® emerges between overall probability of acceptance and e®ectiveness of
screening performance. Increasing the number of hierarchy levels reduces the probability that an
organization accept any given project. But if the probability of acceptance is high, such an increase
makes it more likely that better projects would be accepted.
3.1.2 Polyarchies of Hierarchies
It is straightforward to prove that an optimal polyarchy of hierarchies should have equal number of
components. The screening function of a polyarchy of I
K hierarchies, each of which has K agents,
given by (??) above, has the following properties. First, it is increasing concave in the total number
of agents; second, it is convex decreasing in the number of hierarchy levels; and third, it is monoton-
ically increasing and sigmoid in individual screening performance. This follows from the fact that
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and is, therefore decreasing in the size of the organization but increasing in the number of hierar-
chies. It has a unique ¯xed point in (0;1); ^ pPH; where it intersects the 45o from below. A tradeo®
emerges between overall probability of acceptance and e®ectiveness of screening performance, the
counterpart to the one for a hierarchy of polyarchies: increasing the number of hierarchy levels re-
duces the probability that an organization accept any given project while favoring better projects.
3.2 Endogenous Individual Screening E®ectiveness
We saw that both hierarchies of polyarchies and polyarchies of hierarchies with identical agents are
associated with screening performance functions that are sigmoid in individual screening perfor-
mance. Therefore, it is the mixing of architectures that is responsible for the sigmoidicity of the
performance function and thus the possibility of improvements similar to those enabled by com-
position. However, even cross-composing once moves the organization toward improved screening
performance.
Next we endogenize individual screening performance by optimally setting the wage rate for an
organization with a given screening function P[¢]. A higher wage sharpens the e®ectiveness of the
typical agent, in that the probability of accepting a good project, Pg(w); is increasing concave, and
the probability of accepting a bad project, Pb(w); is decreasing convex in the wage rate. Working
from the de¯nition of expected pro¯t (1), the optimal wage rate must satisfy the ¯rst- and second-
order conditions:
® ¢ Rg ¢ P0 [Pg(w)]P0
g + (1 ¡ ®) ¢ Rb ¢ P0 [Pb(w)]P0














An interesting result readily follows. A su±cient condition for the existence of a unique optimal
wage rate is that the screening function P be increasing sigmoid in its argument, being initially
convex and then concave. In such a case, a su±ciently high value of the wage rate makes the ¯rst
term within the ¯rst set of parentheses in (5) negative, because of the concavity of P[Pg(w)] for
high values of w. It also makes the ¯rst term within the second set of parentheses positive, because
of the convexity of P[Pb(w)] for high values of w, making it more likely that the entire second
term be negative. As the wage rate increases, each agent becomes more adept in recognizing good
11projects, thus increasing Pg(w); and also more adept in recognizing bad projects, thus decreasing
Pb(w).
This reveals a critical role of the fact that the screening function is sigmoid when screening
performance is endogenized via the wage rate. However, for the optimal wage w¤ to also cause the
organization to be more e®ective in screening projects relative to an individual agent, it must be
the case that the probability of accepting a bad project should be below p¤; the ¯xed point of P[¢],
and the probability of accepting a good project should be above it, or
Pb(w¤) < p¤ < Pg(w¤): (6)
Practically speaking, the nearer that the ¯xed and the in°ection points, ^ p and ~ p; of the organization's
screening function are to one another, the more likely it is that condition (6) be satis¯ed.
3.3 Sorting versus Mixing with Heterogeneous Agents and Sah{Stiglitz Archi-
tectures
If agents di®er in terms of screening e®ectiveness, how should agents be grouped across ¯rms in
terms of their screening e®ectiveness?8 We consider two ¯rms, each of which employs two agents
and chooses them out of a total of four agents. There are two of each of two di®erent types of
agents, with screening e®ectiveness p1 and p2; respectively. Each ¯rm's output is proportional to a
¯rm's probability of approving a project.
If both ¯rms are organized as hierarchies, then each ¯rm's expected revenue is proportional
to product of the screening probabilities of its workers, and thus a convex function of their p's,
provided that such screening by each of the two workers is independent. E±ciency then dictates
that agents working for hierarchical ¯rms be sorted. That is, total expected revenue by two ¯rms
that are organized as hierarchies is greater if both agents of the same type work together, p2
1 + p2
2;
than if they work separately, 2p1p2: p2
1 + p2
2 ¸ 2p1p2: This follows from the convexity properties of
the hierarchy discussed above. This result generalizes readily to the case of many agents. These
results carry over to the comparison of expected pro¯ts, provided that Rg > ¡Rb and that agents
are paid the same. Therefore, depending upon the sensitivity of individual screening e®ectiveness
to the wage rate, the possibility exists for this sorting result to lead to unequal wages. It is possible
8This problem is reminiscent of segregation by skill, discussed by Kremer and Maskin (1996).
12to show that more e®ective workers would be paid more, independently of the wage rate for less
e®ective workers.
If, on the other hand, both ¯rms are organized as polyarchies, then expected revenue is pro-
portional to a concave function of screening probabilities. E±ciency dictates that agents be mixed.
That is , the concavity properties of the polyarchy discussed above imply that total expected revenue
by two ¯rms that are organized as polyarchies is greater if agents of di®erent type work together
than if both agents of the same type work together, 2(1¡(1¡p1)(1¡p2)) ¸ 1¡(1¡p1)2+1¡(1¡p2)2:
Again, this result generalizes readily to the case of many agents. It also carries over to a comparison
of expected pro¯ts, provided Rg > ¡Rb and that agents are paid the same. It is possible to show
that more e®ective agents would be paid more than less e®ective agents but the determination of
the wage structure re°ects, not surprisingly, both screening functions.
Complicating simple Sah{Stiglitz architectures by means of composition preserves the mixing
and sorting properties, because a concave (convex) function of concave (convex) functions is concave
(convex). However, it is not particularly interesting to examine such compositions because the
simple Sah{Stiglitz architectures do not satisfy the Moore-Shannon criterion, and therefore, such
compositions do not improve an organization's screening performance. For this reason, we turn
next to apply the Sah{Stiglitz theory to study properties of organizations that are the outcome of
cross-composition, that is they are either hierarchies of polyarchies or polyarchies of hierarchies.
For a hierarchy of polyarchies we have:
CCHP(p1;I1;:::;pK;IK) = [1 ¡ (1 ¡ p1)I1] £ ::: £ [1 ¡ (1 ¡ pK)IK]: (7)
To consider the impact of di®erent probabilities of individual screening e®ectiveness on organi-
zational architecture, we compare the screening e®ectiveness for two alternative organizations
that are obtained by interchanging an agent from level 1, with an agent from level 2, when a
agent with higher performance is interchanged with an agent with lower performance. The com-
parison depends only upon the value [1 ¡ (1 ¡ p1)I1] £ [1 ¡ (1 ¡ p2)I2] relative to the value of
[1¡(1¡p1)I1¡1(1¡p2)]£[1¡(1¡p2)I2¡1(1¡p1)]: It turns out that if p1 < p2 and I1 · I2; that is,
when there are more higher-ability agents, moving a higher ability agent to the position of a lower
ability agent in a polyarchy of lower-ability and replacing that agent with a lower-ability one in a
polyarchy of higher-ability (thus reducing size di®erences) improves screening e®ectiveness.
13What can we say about sorting versus mixing in organizations that consist of hierarchies of
polyarchies and of polyarchies of hierarchies? We consider the case of I agents of type 1 and of I
agents of type 2 and of 2 ¯rms, and assume the number of agents of each type to be even. If both
¯rms are hierarchies of polyarchies, then
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and it pays on grounds of e±ciency for the agents to be sorted. Similarly, if both ¯rms are pol-


































and it pays on grounds of e±ciency for the agents to be mixed.
4 A Cognitive Model of Screening Performance
The fact that cross-compositions of pure Sah{Stiglitz architectures are characterized by sigmoid
functions of individual performance was shown to be critical in our theory of organizational ar-
chitecture. We now turn to a model of individual screening behavior that emphasizes cognitive
aspects of agents' decision problems. This model allows us to study the performance of general
architectures and to pose the problem of optimal organizational design when agents' decisions are
interdependent. It also allows us to examine the role of top-to-bottom feedback.
We model an individual's screening performance in terms of the magnitude of a performance
index. For individual i; the components of the index h
j
i + Ji­º(i) + ²ij are de¯ned as follows:
h
j
i; j = g;b; is the individual's assessment of a typical project, with h
g
i > hb
i representing the fact
that other things being equal agent i is more likely to accept a good project rather than a bad
project; second is a contribution due to recommendations of an individual's subordinates, ­º(i);
with ­º(i) = 1 (¡1); indicating acceptance (rejection), that carries a positive relative weight Ji
assigned to the recommendations from subordinates; and a third is a random factor, ²ij; to be
discussed shortly. If the value of the index h
j
i +Ji­º(i)+²ij exceeds a certain threshold, then agent
i accepts a project, !i = 1; otherwise, she rejects it, !i = ¡1. Therefore, agent i's decision may
be described by a binary indicator, de¯ned in terms of the distribution function of the ²ijs. We
14assume, for convenience, that the random factor in the comparison is extreme-value distributed
and therefore the probability that agent i approve of a project of quality j; j = g;b; is expressed in





















´i; j = g;b; (8)
where ¯; is a positive parameter that represents the sensitivity of the evaluation to the random
factors, given whether or not a project is good or bad and given the recommendation from subor-
dinates is positive or negative. The case of ¯ ! 0 implies purely random choice: the two outcomes
are equally likely. The higher is ¯ the smaller is the variance of the random, factor associated with
the evaluation.
The evaluation probabilities depend, via parameters ¯;h
g
i;hb
i;Ji both on the intrinsic quality
of a project and on the in°uence of the other members of the organization that report to agent
i: This decomposition is a critical element in that it allows us to examine whether the screening
performance of real-life organizations may be improved when the in°uence on an agent from other
members of an organization may be separated from the e®ect of a project's intrinsic quality and of
random factors. It also allows us to incorporate the impact of di®erent incentives, as for example,
when an agent's performance is sensitive to remuneration, which is not as °exibly done in the
Sah{Stiglitz model. From the results reported in the paper so far, it should be expected that the
most critical feature of the cognitive model is that an agent's evaluation is a sigmoid function
of the recommendations of her subordinates. Finally, having demonstrated how wages may be
endogenized earlier in the paper, we refrain from doing so in this part of the paper.
4.1 General Organizational Architectures
In Section 3 above, Sah{Stiglitz hierarchies and polyarchies were used as building blocks for more
complex organizations. Next we examine organizations which are characterized by interdependence
among agents that does not presuppose one of these architectures. We turn next to the general
notation that we introduced earlier.
Let
»
! denote the I¡vector containing the decisions of agents j = 1;:::;I: Agent i receives
recommendations from her subordinates º(i); which when stacked as a vector are denoted by
»
!º(j).
15Adapting the cognitive model, we have that agent i makes a decision, taking into consideration her
own evaluation and the input from her subordinates ­º(i); which is a general nonlinear function
that aggregates the input from her subordinates
»
!º(i); ­º(i) = ­(
»
!º(i)): Decisions by an agent's
subordinates are assumed to be independent, conditional on the information that they possess in
common and on whether a project is good or bad. Noteworthy special cases are whether an agent
is sensitive to the average of the recommendations from her subordinates, to unanimity among her
subordinates (which corresponds to the Sah{Stiglitz hierarchy), and to whether or not the number
of positive recommendations exceeds the number of negative ones by at least a given number. The
latter could be interpreted as being sensitive to a modi¯ed majority of her subordinates; see Sah
and Stiglitz (1988).
In general, the decision probabilities for agent i may be written in terms of the recommendations








































¢ ªj;i = 1;:::;I; (9)








































where the conditional choice probabilities are given by (8), adapted in the obvious way. The ¯rst
(second) row gives the probabilities that an agent will choose to approve, respectively, to reject,




º(i) is de¯ned as a function of
»
!º(i); and the probability of agent i's decisions,
conditional on a project being good or bad, are given by (9). In order to be able to compute the
screening probabilities of the entire organization, we need to specify the aggregator rule ­º(i); as a
function of the set of the recommendations from agent i's subordinates, ­º(i): Since the organization






may themselves be written by
applying (9) recursively in terms of the probabilities describing the decisions of those reporting to
each agent i; ­º(i): We note that (9) may be adapted to apply when screening takes time, as well
16as when the stochastic dependence occurs contemporaneously and is purely spatial. The tools of
Markov random ¯elds may be used in such a case to analyze organizational equilibrium.
Additional results may be obtained for both pure Sah{Stiglitz architectures, when the number of
agents is large. The limits for the probabilities of the two possible outcomes for large organizations
may be obtained easily. For the hierarchy case, they are given by the invariant distribution of
ªj;j = g;b: For the polyarchy case, they are given by the ¯rst row of ªj: We conclude, therefore,
that for a large number of agents, the pattern of interdependence among agents, as represented
by the stochastic matrix ªj; determines entirely the decisions of the organization. Of course, ªj
encapsulates the fundamentals of the cognitive model. These results are somewhat reminiscent of
the properties of informational cascades with large numbers of agents [ Bikhchandani, et al. (1992)
].
4.2 Averaging the Opinions of Subordinates
We demonstrate some of the possibilities a®orded by this approach by assuming, for simplicity,
that each agent is sensitive to the average recommendation of her subordinates. That is, in a
static model, Ef­º(i)jjg = 1
jº(i)j
P
i02º(i) E f!i0jjg = E f!i0jjg; i0 2 º(i): When the number of
subordinates, jº(i)j is large, then by the law of large numbers the actual magnitude of jº(i)j does
not matter.9 Let us assume that agents are labelled so as agent i = 1 is the boss. Let the set of
agents at level k of the hierarchy be denoted by `(k): In particular, `(1) = 1; and `(K) denotes the
bottom level of the organization. Thus I =
SK
k=1 `(k): It then follows, for both j = g;b; that:




i + ¯JiE f!i0jjg
´
; i0 2 º(i); 8i 2 `(k); k = 1;:::;K ¡ 1; (11)
E f!ijjg = tanh(¯h
j
i); 8i 2 `(K): (12)
These results allow us to adapt the expression for expected pro¯t from considering a randomly
chosen project, according to (1). In the simplest possible case when each level of the hierarchy
9The case when an agent is sensitive to the actual sample mean of the responses of her subordinates is of particular
interest because it models the case of modi¯ed majority. In fact, the probability distribution for the sample mean
may expressed in terms of those for the number of favorable (or of unfavorable) recommendations. Speci¯cally, let
Yi denote the sample mean: Yi =
P
i2º(i) !i: Then, using the fact that favorable recommendations are coded by 1
and unfavorable ones by ¡1, implies that the number of favorable recommendations is equal to
Yi+jº(i)j
2 : However,
the probability distribution for this random variable may be expressed in terms of the probability for success in jº(i)j
Bernoulli trials.
17contains a single agent, K = I; and all agents are identical, expected pro¯t from (1),
Rg ¢ ® ¢ Probf!
g
1 = 1jgg + Rb ¢ (1 ¡ ®) ¢ Probf!b
1 = 1jbg ¡ Kw; (13)
may be computed by computing recursively the probabilities attached to recommendations by all
agents. That is, the acceptance probability by agent 1, given quality j; may be obtained recursively







; and so on down the hierarchy
according to (11) and (12), separately for j = g;b: Given wages, then the optimal number of
hierarchy levels is de¯ned in terms of the trade-o® between the advantage of additional workers'
improving the organization's screening performance and their cost. It is straightforward to establish
that Probf!1 = 1jgg is an increasing concave function of K; and Probf!1 = 1jbg is decreasing
convex function of K; the number of hierarchies (and agents). Therefore, Rb < 0 su±ces for
expected revenue to be concave in the number of agents and therefore for the optimal number of
agents to be well de¯ned, given w.
Next we demonstrate how adding levels in the hierarchy improves organizational screening
performance. We gauge the improvement in performance as the number of agents increases in
terms of reduction in the probability that the organization reject good projects, given by
Probf!
j
1 = ¡1jgg =
1
2
[1 ¡ tanh(¯hg + ¯JE(!2))]; (14)
and in the probability that it accept bad projects, given by
Probf!
j









As we see shortly, both these conditional acceptance probabilities decrease as we increase the
number of levels of the hierarchy. In fact, the limits of these probabilities as the number of levels
tends to in¯nity may be characterized precisely as follows.
It is easiest to do this graphically. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the contribution
of project quality to the performance index satis¯es that hb < 0 < hg: Starting with the agent
at level K;the bottom of the hierarchy, the probability of rejecting a good project is given by
1







. These probabilities are equal 1
2jG1G1j and 1
2jB1B1j; respectively, in Figure 2. The rejection
18probability for a good project after adding a second agent is given by:
Probf!1 = 1jgg =
1
2
[1 ¡ tanh(¯hg + ¯J (tanh(¯hg)))];
and similarly for the acceptance probability for a bad project. Referring to Figure 2, we mark the
point with horizontal coordinate equal to jO1g1j = ¯hg and then obtain the value of tanh(¯hg + ¯J tanh(¯hg)):
By construction, this quantity, marked by jG2G2j; is less than jG1G1j = tanh(¯hg): It then follows
that as the number of levels K increases tending to in¯nity, the acceptance probability for a good
project tends asymptotically to 1 minus the value of the upper ¯xed point of $ = tanh[¯hg + ¯J$]:
This ¯xed point, to be referred to as $; always exists and is stable if hg > 0 [ Ioannides (2001),
Proposition 1]. We may work in the same manner for the acceptance probability for a bad project.
We conclude that since the upper and lower ¯xed points of the respective screening functions
are well de¯ned, they provide the lower bounds for the screening probabilities. These ¯xed points
can always be computed in an iterative fashion from the above formulas. They may not be reduced
further by increasing the number of agents, but the optimal size of the ¯rm is well de¯ned.
4.3 Organizations with Top-to-Bottom Feedback
We next turn to examining screening performance when there is feedback from higher levels to lower
levels of the hierarchy. We examine an extreme example, that is when the boss directs the lower
level sta® to projects after her own preliminary assessment of their quality. As we see shortly, this
model introduces endogenous social interactions that a®ect organizational screening performance.
Such feedbacks from agents at higher levels of an organization to those at lower levels organizational
performance are reminiscent of a model of social interactions in organizations like that of DeMarzo,
Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003). 10 A boss's in°uencing the evaluation process at the lowest level of
the hierarchy is a special case of the listening structure in ibid.. This would be a way to model
the role of an organization's principal in setting an organization's agenda. A key consequence of
10In DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003), individuals update their own beliefs by weighting the beliefs of the
other agents they \listen to" in terms the respective relative precisions. The resulting dynamic model in implies that
in the long run beliefs converge to a set of consensus beliefs which depend only on the spectral properties of the matrix
that describes the listening structure. In the special case of hierarchical organizations possessing a \standard listening
structure," that is where every agent except the chief has a single boss and each agent listens to her subordinates and
to all of those located higher up than herself, the relative beliefs over the frequency distribution that characterizes
consensus beliefs of an agent and a subordinate depend only on the numbers of her subordinates and on her level in
the hierarchy [ ibid., Theorem 10 ].
19this assumption is, as we see shortly, that the principal's input to entry level decisions in°uences
all decisions and by cascading back up to her cause the equilibrium outcome to be independent of
the number of agents.
Suppose that agents at level K expect agent 1's average decision to be ^ !
j
1; conditional on a




































1; and is given
a ¯xed point of the function T K. The ¯xed points of this function coincide with the ¯xed points
of the function $ = tanh(¯hj + ¯J$): Ioannides (2001) shows that there may either one or three
¯xed points, depending upon parameter values. Therefore, we conclude that due to \closure" in
the listening structure ( made possible by the top level's providing feedback directly to the lowest
level of the hierarchy, the screening probabilities at equilibrium are independent of the number of
levels of the hierarchy. The screening probabilities are given by 1








, for bad projects, where $g is the upper ¯xed point of
$ = tanh(¯hg + ¯J$); and $b is the lower ¯xed point of $ = tanh(¯hb + ¯J$): This also means
that the number of hierarchy levels, and thus the number of agents as well, is indeterminate.
The symmetry with which all agents are treated and the fact that the model rests only the
average decision are clearly responsible for the resulting independence from the number of agents.
We recall that the model without feedback is inherently asymmetric. By slightly modifying the
above model, that is by allowing for an in°uence coe±cient from agent 1 to agent K; J1K; that
di®ers from J; we end up with explicit dependence of the screening probabilities on the number of
hierarchy levels and of agents. The dependence of the decision of agent 1 on that of the agents at
level K is expressed by:
E f!1g = T K¡1
³
¯hj + ¯JE f!Kg
´
; (16)
and the dependence of the decision of agent K on that of agent 1 is expressed by:
E f!Kg = tanh
³
¯hj + ¯J1KE f!1g
´
: (17)
20Proposition 1 in Ioannides (2001) again applies with minimal modi¯cation and ensures that there
exist an upper ¯xed point $g of Equ. (16) { (17) for j = g; and a lower ¯xed point $b of Equ.
(16) { (17) for j = b: The screening probabilities for good, respectively, bad projects are given by
the same formulas as above and are concave increasing, respectively, convex decreasing functions
of the number of hierarchy levels. Therefore, the optimal size of the organization is well de¯ned.
The quantities $b and $b coincide with those of the symmetric case above, when J1K = J:
This result allows us to conclude that the cognitive model of individual behavior does not allow
us to avoid the complexity of the Von Neumann{Moore{Shannon solution. Still, it is interesting that
top-to-bottom feedback improves screening performance over an ¯nite-sized hierarchy, by allowing
an organization to attain immediately the best possible values for the likelihood of rejecting good
projects and of accepting bad ones as equilibrium outcomes.
The results of this example and of the earlier one on averaging over the opinions of subordinates
both demonstrate an important property of the cognitive model: organizational screening perfor-
mance is sigmoid function of hj;j = g;b; each agent's contribution to her own evaluation of a typical
project. With the cognitive model, adding agents improves over individual screening performance
even with pure Sah{Stiglitz architecture, and even without mixing (that is, cross-composing) of
architectures.
5 Conclusion
This paper models organizations whose members are engaged in screening projects. It examines
how architectural features of organizations a®ect organizational screening performance. It shows
that for an organization of several agents to be able to improve upon individual performance, the
organization's screening function must be sigmoid in individual performance. Without a cognitive
model of individual performance, organizations with mixed Sah{Stiglitz architectures, such as hier-
archies made up of components that are polyarchies and polyarchies made up of components that
are hierarchies, do give rise to such functions. This property is in turn critical for the determination
of optimal ¯rm size and levels of hierarchy, and the endogenous determination of individual screen-
ing performance. They are examined in detail in this paper. The paper also introduces a cognitive
model that allows for individuals' own screening e®orts to combine with in°uence from others,
21subordinates and superiors. Such a model makes an agent's screening performance be sigmoid with
respect to the in°uence of others. The paper examines the implications of such interactions for the
limits to organizational performance.
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